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#### Interpretation- economic engagement excludes political/military/cultural engagement- the alternative is unlimiting and destroys education

Haass and O’Sullivan 2K, - Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director (Richard and Meghan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books)//VP

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market." Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders-or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educa- tional Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country's armed forces and, more feasibly, to estab- lish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers." These areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institu- tions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links be- tween the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the coun- tries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cul- tural engagement. This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strat- egies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific character- istics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engage- ment and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

#### **Violation – it includes non-economic mandates and opens up military intervention**

Department of State, no date ("Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism", www.state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf)//VP

Designating countries that repeatedly support

international terrorism (that is, placing a country

on the terrorism list) imposes four main sets of

US Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.

2. Controls over exports of dual-use items,

requiring 30-day Congressional notiﬁcation

for goods or services that could signiﬁcantly

enhance the terrorist-list country’s military

capability or ability to support terrorism.

3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.

4. Imposition of miscellaneous ﬁnancial and

other restrictions, including:

• Requiring the United States to oppose

loans by the World Bank and other

international ﬁnancial institutions.

• Lifting the diplomatic immunity to allow

families of terrorist victims to ﬁle civil

lawsuits in US courts.

• Denying companies and individuals tax

credits for income earned in terrorist-list

countries.

• Denial of duty-free treatment for goods

exported to the United States.

• Authority to prohibit any US person from

engaging in a ﬁnancial transaction with

a terrorism-list government without a

Treasury Department license.

• Prohibition of Defense Department

contracts above $100,000 with companies

controlled by terrorist-list states.

#### **That’s a voting issue for fairness and education – allowing military affs explodes the topic, adds a whole new topic to an already large resolution, kills predictability and ground – extra topicality is an independent voting issues**

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#### Immigration reform will pass now

Leopold 10/24 David, Immigration Attorney/Immigration Reform Advocate, past president & past general counsel, American Immigration Lawyers Association, Huffington Post, Immigration Reform Is Alive and Kicking on Capitol Hill, 10/24/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-leopold/immigration-reform-is-alive\_b\_4136478.html

As it turns out, reports of the death of immigration reform were greatly exaggerated. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.), Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) and other House Republicans and Democrats are reportedly working on various immigration plans, some of which, including a bill to be released next week by Issa, deal with the toughest issue of all -- what to do about the nation's 11.7 million undocumented immigrants. And Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) says that immigration reform could get to the floor of the House before the end of the year.¶ Is common sense breaking out on Capitol Hill? That might be too much to ask for. But at least the GOP leadership seems to be taking a hard look at political reality.¶ Here are four big reasons why an immigration overhaul is likely to happen by the end of the year:¶ 1. Immigration reform is a political win-win for Democrats and Republicans.¶ I can't say that either the Democrats or Republicans came out of last week's shutdown and debt limit brinksmanship looking good to the American people, but the whole debacle hurt the Republicans much more. A recent NBCNews/Wall Street Journal poll found that the public blames the GOP more than President Obama by 53 percent to 31 percent, a 21 point margin. And approval ratings for the Republican party are at an all-time low -- never before in the history of polling have the numbers shown such blatant disappointment.¶ Immigration reform gives the Republicans a unique opportunity to do something big, to reach across the aisle and work with House Democrats to pass real immigration reform either in a comprehensive package or as a series of bills that ultimately have a chance to fix what's wrong with our immigration system. It would be a colossal mistake for the House GOP not to seize the chance to lead on immigration reform. The American people want it, the country needs it, and it's a pathway to political redemption for the badly bruised Republican party.¶ 2. The immigration reform coalition is unified and ready to make the final push.¶ A broad coalition of business, labor, faith-based and ethnic groups are full of energy and ready to finish the job the Senate started in the spring. In the midst of the combined "shutdown and debt ceiling" crisis, thousands of Americans descended on Washington to join the "March for Dignity and Respect." Eight members of Congress, including civil rights icon John Lewis (D-Ga.), joined together in an historic act of civil disobedience and were arrested near the steps of the Capitol in a show of solidarity with the immigration reform movement. As Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) wrote recently in his The Huffington Post column "Why I Went To Jail":¶ Some may call it a publicity stunt. Some may call it a political theater. For whatever reason some may think I stood out there with thousands of clergy and advocates calling for immigration reform, the fact is that it got attention. And immigration reform is a critical issue that desperately needs it. If eight Members of Congress getting thrown in jail is what it takes to get people talking about it, then I'll gladly sit in the slammer. We cannot let ourselves forget that our nation has been built by immigrants, and the story of America began with people from another nation traveling to our shores.¶ Congress needs to fix the twisted morass of rules and regulations that pass for America's immigration policy. No longer can we sit idle as our mess of a "system" ruthlessly breaks up American families, stifles economic growth, and compromises our nation's democratic principles. Now is the time.¶ 3. The DREAMERs have become doers.¶ A funny thing happened since the DREAM Act was first introduced in 2001. The DREAMERs grew up. And they grew up as Americans, watching football, going to homecoming dances, eating hotdogs on the 4th of July and dreaming about giving back to the country they've struggled against all odds to enrich. They are no longer the helpless children who were brought to the U.S. by their parents. Today they are, in effect, undocumented Americans.¶ Through masterful use of 21st century tools like Facebook and Twitter, coupled with old-fashioned organizing and courage, the DREAMERs have become a key voice in the struggle for immigration reform. They, more than any other group, deserve the lion's share of credit for pushing the administration to grant an administrative deportation reprieve to qualified undocumented youth last year.¶ For DREAMERs there is no giving up on their journey toward U.S. citizenship. They will no longer take no for an answer.¶ 4. Now is the time.¶ The passion is there, the energy is there, and, most of all, the American people are there. It's time for both parties to sit down together and create an immigration process that will protect our borders, keep our families safe and together, give our businesses the tools they need to compete in the global economy, and provide a road map to lawful immigration status for the 11 million aspiring citizens currently living in the shadows.¶ Now, not later. Now.

#### Bipartisan effort to not remove Cuba

**Ros-Lehtian 13** – Congresswoman For FL-27 (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Bipartisan Congressional Group Asks Administration to Keep Cuba on State Sponsor of Terrorism List, Official website of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, April 29, 2013, <http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/bipartisan-congressional-group-asks-administration-keep-cuba-state-sponsor-terrorism>) TA

A bipartisan group of Congressional Members (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio Sires) explained today in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry the reasons why Cuba should remain on the State Sponsors of Terrorism.¶ Statement by Ros-Lehtinen:¶ “The Castro regime must continue to be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism as it:¶ supports and collaborates with Iran and Syria, fellow sponsors of terrorism;¶ provides a safe haven for members of terrorist organizations such as the FARC and ETA;¶ offers sanctuary for fugitives from the U.S. (such as cop killer Joanne Chesimard);¶ unjustly holds a U.S. citizen hostage (Alan Gross);¶ ordered the Brothers to the Rescue shootdown resulting in the deaths of U.S. citizens; and¶ continues its active espionage networks that attempt to undermine U.S. interests and poses a risk to our national security.

#### Capital is key – allows Obama to thread the needle – there’s momemtum now

McMorris-Santoro 10/15 Evan, BuzzFeed Staff, Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next, 10/15/13, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for

As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win.¶ The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer.¶ “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.”¶ The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck.¶ “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’”¶ The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.¶ Asked about future strategic plans after the shutdown Monday, a senior White House official said, “That’s a conversation for when the government opens and we haven’t defaulted.” But on Tuesday, Press Secretary Jay Carney specifically mentioned immigration when asked “how the White House proceeds” after the current fracas is history.¶ “Just like we wish for the country, for deficit reduction, for our economy, that the House would follow the Senate’s lead and pass comprehensive immigration reform with a big bipartisan vote,” he said. “That might be good for the Republican Party. Analysts say so; Republicans say so. We hope they do it.”¶ The president set immigration as his next priority in an interview with Univision Tuesday.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama said. He also set up another fight with the House GOP on the issue.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”¶ Don’t expect the White House effort to include barnstorming across the country on behalf of immigration reform in the days after the fiscal crisis ends, reform proponents predict. Advocates said the White House has tried hard to help immigration reform along, and in the current climate that means trying to thread the needle with Republicans who support reform but have also reflexively opposed every one of Obama’s major policy proposals.¶ Democrats and advocates seem to hope the GOP comes back to immigration on its own, albeit with a boost from Democrats eager to join them. Polls show Republicans have taken on more of the blame from the fiscal battle of the past couple of weeks. But Tom Jensen, a pollster with the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling, said moving to pass immigration reform could be just what the doctor ordered to get the public back on the side of the Republicans.¶ “We’ve consistently found that a sizable chunk of Republican voters support immigration reform, and obviously a decent number of Republican politicians do too,” Jensen said. “After this huge partisan impasse, they may want to focus on something that’s not quite as polarized, and immigration would certainly fit the bill since we see voters across party lines calling for reform.”

#### We have a moral obligation to support comprehensive reform –solves exploitation and takes a stand against unethical practices – this is the politics of invisibility – we refuse to contemplate those that are affected by our decisions Noorani 10 (Ali, Executive Director of the Reform Immigration FOR America campaign and National Immigration Forum, Why We Must Continue Pushing for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, <http://immigration.change.org/blog/view/why_we_must_continue_pushing_for_comprehensive_immigration_reform>)//VP There are 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States today. And there are 279 Congressional votes standing between those people and the American dream. The fight for those 279 votes that 11 million people need has been long and tough, but now, more than ever, is the time for our courage and leadership.  In April, Arizona enshrined racial profiling into law — and awakened millions to the current civil rights crisis the immigrant community is facing in our country. Arizona changed the game and brought the urgency of our fight to a fever pitch.  Since then, at least 18 states have considered legislation similar to the Arizona law. The lack of political courage from both the White House and members of Congress to tackle immigration reform has left a vacuum that states like Arizona are rushing to fill with their own measures — and these measures mostly focus only on enforcement with no thought given to families and workers.  Immigration is no longer a policy debate; it is a political battle with clear choices: Legalization or criminalization. Justice for all or racial profiling. Family unity or family separation.  We, as advocates, also have a clear choice. We can negotiate with ourselves and entice our opponents to the table by proposing piecemeal options. But, an effort to push anything short of a comprehensive overhaul of our broken system would both give our opponents a reprieve from working on a bi-partisan solution to one of our nation’s most pressing problems and give our allies the choice of checking off the “immigration” box on their to-do list without having fully addressed the issue.  Anything less than full legalization of the 11 million undocumented immigrants is unacceptable, and we should not demand anything less.  **We have a moral obligation to push for real reform that brings justice to all of our communities**. We won’t allow the inaction of Congress to force us into negotiating away our power. The courage of those 11 million people is our power. If we back off from organizing the entire community, we will fail to create — much less take advantage of — the opportunities that lie ahead.  The American public has shown that they are in favor of immigration reform with a pathway to legalization. Our communities have stood up and made their voices heard. Arizona has ignited the 21st century fight for civil rights.  Now is the time for our lawmakers to step up and stop putting politics above what is right and just.  We must continue increasing our pressure. There are no lack of options in front of the President and Congress to legalize the undocumented, keep families together and reform our immigration system in the interests of our nation. There is only a lack conviction. And it’s up to us, as immigration rights advocates, to force them to do the right thing, and bring real, comprehensive reform to all 11 million undocumented immigrants, leaving no one behind.

#### This supports a system of power of domination – causes war and destruction

**LaBalme 02** (Fen, *Activism.net,* “Activism: Pease: NVCD: Discrimination,” 2002, http://www.activism.net/peace/nvcdh/discrimination.shtml, accessed July 2, 2009)//VP

In this action, our struggle is not only against missiles and bombs, but against the system of power they defend: a system based on domination, on the belief that some people have more value than others, and therefore have the right to control others, to exploit them so that they can lead better lives than those they oppress. We say that all people have value. No person, no group, has the right to wield power over the decisions and resources of others. The structure of our organizations and the processes we use among ourselves are our best attempt to live our belief in self-determination. Besides working against discrimination of all kinds among ourselves, we must try to understand how such discrimination supports the system which produces nuclear weapons. For some people who come to this action, the overriding issue is the struggle to prevent nuclear destruction. For others, that struggle is not separate from the struggles against racism, sexism, classism, and the oppression of groups of people because of their sexual orientation, religion, age, physical (dis)ability, appearance, or life history. Understood this way, it is clear that nuclear weapons are already killing people, forcing them to lead lives of difficulty and struggle. Nuclear war has already begun, and it claims its victims disproportionately from native peoples, the Third World, women, and those who are economically vulnerable because of the history of oppression. All oppressions are interlocking. We separate racism, classism, etc. in order to discuss them, not to imply that any form of oppression works in isolation. We know that to work against any one of these is not just to try to stop something negative, but to build a positive vision. Many in the movement call this larger goal feminism. Calling our process "feminist process" does not mean that women dominate or exclude men; on the contrary, it challenges all systems of domination. The term recognizes the historical importance of the feminist movement in insisting that nonviolence begins at home, in the ways we treat each other.

#### It will culminate in extinction – we control the scale of violence

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 04** (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)//VP

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. **These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite**. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

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#### Aff frees up resources to be used for the War on Terror

**Levy 11** – Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Affairs at the University of Denver, received the Leonard Marks Essay Award of the American Academy of Diplomacy, masters degree from Columbia in International Affairs. (Arturo, Center for International policy/Latin American Working Group, “A Call for Cuba’s Removal from the List of State Sponsers of Terrorism,” 12/1/11, http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg\_cip\_dec\_2011.pdf)//RGP

So, let me discuss the first issue, why including Cuba on the terrorist list harms American ¶ efforts and leadership in the Global War against terrorism. Cuba’s inclusion on the list is based on bogus allegations that undermine its credibility. By ¶ lumping Cuba together with Iran, Syria, and Sudan, a potentially effective foreign policy tool for ¶ warning Americans and the international community against countries that “repeatedly provide ¶ support for international terrorism” becomes a list of governments that some South Floridians ¶ don’t like. Foreign policy is not about therapy. If the goal is to provide right wing Cuban ¶ Americans a venue for catharsis, there are other ways less harmful to US national security for ¶ them to vent their frustrations.¶ The list of terrorism sponsoring nations should be a bargaining tool for dealing with, well, ¶ countries that engage in or sponsor terrorism. The misuse of a first level national security ¶ concern must give pause to responsible members of the Washington Foreign Policy community. ¶ First, it distracts efforts and resources in the wrong direction, taking eyes and dollars from ¶ where the real threats are. Second, it sends the wrong messages to other countries, diminishing ¶ the appeal of the list as a warning against countries such as Iran or Syria, in which the threat of ¶ cooperation with and sponsorship of terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah against the ¶ United States and our allies is really serious. Third, it weakens the capacity of US allies like Israel ¶ or India, who are real targets of terrorist threats, to make a case for sanctioning or monitoring ¶ of countries or entities such as Iran whose presence on the list is justified. ¶ The three Cuba Reports (2008, 09, and 10) by the State Department Office of the Coordinator ¶ for Counterterrorism written under the Obama Administration are more an argument for ¶ removing rather than for keeping the island on the list. This is particularly evident in the ¶ discussion of Cuba’s alleged links with three groups connected to international terrorist ¶ activities: The FARC and the ELN from Colombia, and the Spanish ETA. In addition to ETA’s ¶ recent announcement of its demobilization, making this a non issue, the presence of members

#### Anti-terror efforts are only a symptom of a neoliberal domestic agenda

**Lafer 4** - political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center (Gordon, “Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad,” New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis) //RGP

If the war in Iraq is really about something other than weapons, what is the domestic “war on terror” about? At ﬁrst glance, the war at home appears to be more straightforward: a genuine if heavy-handed effort to prevent a repeat of anything like the attacks of September 11, 2001. But here too, the administration’s actions point to motives that are mixed at best. On the one hand, genuine security measures are often treated with a surprising degree of laxity. Whistleblowers within the federal intelligence community complain that problems identiﬁed two years ago have remained unresolved. The multicolored national security alerts have produced great public drama but, as far as the public has been told, have never had any relationship to major terrorist attacks either committed or deterred. Critical needs such as preparing the public health system to cope with potential bioterrorist attacks, or supporting the anti-terrorism work of state and local police, have gone unfunded as the monies were diverted to tax cuts.34 At the same time, a wide range of initiatives apparently unrelated to anything to do with terrorism—including the tax cuts, “fast track” authority, and deunionization of federal jobs, have all been advanced as critical components of the war on terror.35 I assume that the government is genuinely interested in preventing terrorism. Nevertheless, these facts suggest that the administration’s agenda is more complex, and much more ambitious than simply that of protecting the population from future attacks. And while any one of these items may be viewed as an individual case of cronyism or opportunism, the broader pattern points to the need for a deeper theory of what is driving the regime’s domestic agenda. I believe that the domestic agenda, too, can only be understood in the context of neoliberal globalization. One of the axioms of globalization is that capital accumulation has become disconnected from the nation-state. Before “global city” became the mantra of Chamber of Commerce boosters everywhere, it was geographer SaskiaSassen’s term for the locales that are home to the administrative headquarters of far-ﬂung corporate empires.36 As corporate production, distribution and services have grown into complex, worldwide networks, those at the top need ever greater capacity at central headquarters in order to coordinate these global empires. A handful of cities have come to serve as the central hubs of ﬁnancial, legal, accounting, marketing and telecommunicationsfunctions for global capital. These cities are “global” because their dominant industries participate in an economy that is increasingly disconnected from the fortunes of any particular nation. The functional colleagues of New York lawyers and stockbrokers are London lawyers and brokers. By contrast, both have increasingly little economic connection to normal manufacturing and service workers. The latter are stuck in a parallel economy that, while sharing the same physical and political space, has no means of participating in the growing fortunes of corporate empires. It may never have been true that what was good for GM was good for America, but over the past 20 years the connection between the success of “American” companies and the prosperity of Americans has grown threadbare.

#### Unlimited neoliberalism and imperialist conquest inevitably results in extinction, every modern war has been a byproduct of the spread of colonialism

**Harvey 6** - Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (David, “Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development,” Chapter 13, 5/7/2013) //RGP

At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of devaluation. The export of unemployment, of inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange, immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation and domination of tributary economies, the forced reorganization of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the physical destruction and forced devaluation of a rival's capital through war are some of the methods at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be cured through world domination by some omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so easily be contained. Yet the degeneration of economic into political struggles plays its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism, provided enough capital is destroyed en route. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We will shortly return to this aspect of matters since it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the survival of capitalism (which matters not a jot), but to the survival of the human race. Twice in the twentieth century, the world has been plunged into global war through inter-imperialist rivalries. Twice in the space of a generation, the world experienced the massive devaluation of capital through physical destruction, the ultimate consumption of labour power as cannon fodder. Class warfare, of course, has taken its toll in life and limb, mainly through the violence daily visited by capital upon labour in the work place and through the violence of primitive accumulation (including imperialist wars fought against other social formations in the name of capitalist 'freedoms'). But the vast losses incurred in two world wars were provoked by inter-imperialist rivalries. How can this be explained on the basis of a theory that appeals to the class relation between capital and labour as fundamental to the interpretation of history? This was, of course, the problem with which Lenin wrestled in his essay on imperialism. But his argument, as we saw in chapter 10, is plagued by ambiguity. Is finance capital national or international? What is the relation, then, between the military and political deployment of state power and the undoubted trend within capitalism to create multinational forms and to forge global spatial integration? And if monopolies and finance capital were so powerful and prone in any case to collusion, then why could they not contain capitalism's contradictions short of destroying each other? What is it, then, that makes inter-imperialist wars necessary to the survival of capitalism? The 'third cut' at crisis theory suggests an interpretation of inter-imperialist wars as constitutive moments in the dynamics of accumulation, rather than as abberations, accidents or the simple product of excessive greed. Let us see how this is so. When the 'inner dialectic' at work within a region drives it to seek external resolutions to its problems, then it must search out new markets, new opportunities for capital export, cheap raw materials, low-cost labour power, etc. All such measures, if they are to be anything other than a temporary palliative, either put a claim on future labour or else directly entail an expansion of the proletariat. This expansion can be accomplished through population growth, the mobilization of latent sectors of the reserve army, or primitive accumulation. The insatiable thirst of capitalism for fresh supplies of labour accounts for the vigour with which it has pursued primitive accumulation, destroying, transforming and absorbing pre-capitalist populations wherever it finds them. When surpluses of labour are there for the taking, and capitalists have not, through competition, erroneously pinned their fates to a technological mix which cannot absorb that labour, then crises are typically of short duration, mere hiccups on a general trajectory of sustained global accumulation, and usually manifest as mild switching crises within an evolving structure of uneven geographical development. This was standard fare for nineteenth-century capitalism. The real troubles begin when capitalists, fating shortages of labour supply and as ever urged on by competition, induce unemployment through technological innovations which disturb the equilibrium between production and realization, between the productive forces and their accompanying social relations. The closing of the frontiers to primitive accumulation, through sheer exhaustion of possibilities, increasing resistance on the part of pre-capitalist populations, or monopolization by some dominant power, has, therefore, a tremendous significance for the long-run stability of capitalism. This was the sea-change that began to be felt increasingly as capitalism moved into the twentieth century. It was the sea-change that, far more than the rise of monopoly or finance forms of capitalism, played the crucial role in pushing capitalism deeper into the mire of global crises and led, inexorably, to the kinds of primitive accumulation and devaluation jointly wrought through inter-capitalist wars. The mechanisms, as always, are intricate in their details and greatly confused in actual historical conjunctures by innumerable cross-currents of conflicting forces. But we can construct a simple line of argument to illustrate the important points. Any regional alliance, if it is to continue the process of accumulation, must maintain access to reserves of labour as well as to those 'forces of nature' (such as key mineral resources) that are otherwise capable of monopolization. Few problems arise if reserves of both exist in the region wherein most local capital circulates. When internal frontiers close, capital has to look elsewhere or risk devaluation. The regional alliance feels the stress between capital embedded in place and capital that moves to create new and permanent centres of accumulation elsewhere. Conflict between different regional and national capitals over access to labour reserves and natural resources begins to be felt. The themes of internationalism and multilaterialism run hard up against the desire for autarky as the means to preserve the position of some particular region in the face of internal contradictions and external pressures - autarky of the sort that prevailed in the 193Os, as Britain sealed in its Commonwealth trade and Japan expanded into Manchuria and mainland Asia, Germany into eastern Europe and Italy into Africa, pitting different regions against each other, each pursuing its own 'spatial fix'. Only the United States found it appropriate to pursue an 'open door' policy founded on internationalism and multilateral trading. In the end the war was fought to contain autarky and to open up the whole world to the potentialities of geographical expansion and unlimited uneven development. That solution, pursued single-mindedly under United States's hegemony after 1945, had the advantage of being super-imposed upon one of the most savage bouts of devaluation and destruction ever recorded in capitalism's violent history. And signal benefits accrued not simply from the immense destruction of capital, but also from the uneven geographical distribution of that destruction. The world was saved from the terrors of the great depression not by some glorious 'new deal' or the magic touch of Keynesian economics in the treasuries of the world, but by the destruction and death of global war.

## 1NC

#### Text: the United States federal government should add every country to the list of countries governed by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. The United States federal government should cease current and ban future projects of regime change, economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, isolation of disapproved political movements, and counterterrorism operations to countries governed by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act.

#### Counterplan solves – the aff takes Cuba off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the counterplan adds every country to the list of state sponsors of terrorism but says being on the list of state sponsors of terrorism prevents the US from being able to militarily or coercively intervene in that country’s affairs. Your author concludes the only reason the list is problematic is it allows neoconservative approaches towards those countries, but we solve that better

**Jackson 7 -** Professor in International Politics at Aberystwyth University (Richard, “Critical reflection on counter-sanctuary discourse”, In: M. Innes, ed. Denial of sanctuary: understanding terrorist safe havens, p. 30-33) //RGP

A related problem for the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has always been characterized by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the mainstream terrorism literature during the Cold War demonstrates that terrorism experts regularly identified Iran, Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union and many other mainly communist countries as "state sponsors" of "international terrorism," but failed to include countries like Israel or South Africa—despite the fact that South Africa, for example, not only engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in neighbouring states but also sponsored movements like Unita and Renamo who engaged in extensive terrorism. The "terrorist sanctuaries" literature from this period also focused heavily on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to groups like the PLO, but failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like the Afghan Mujahaddin. anti-Castro groups, and the Contras, despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts of terrorism, including planting car bombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian massacres, and blowing up civilian airliners.51 Many would argue that from this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse has functioned ideologically to distract from and deny the long history of the West's direct involvement in state terrorism and its support and sanctuary for a number of anticommunist terrorist groups. Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the United States, and other colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the colonial period; U.S. support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent groups like the Contras and the Mujahideen during the Cold War 53; U.S. tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the United States54: U.S. support for systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia. and Iran 55; British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Irelands 56 and various other "Islamist" groups in Libya and Bosnia, among others57; Spanish state terror during the "dirty war" against ETA58; French support for terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with terrorists following the end of several high profile wars59—among many other examples. In short. there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly selective manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely,' called terrorists. despite overwhelming evidence of their use of terror and intimidation against civilians. This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad Al Islam iya group is typically described as a terrorist organization with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords who also use violence against civilians arc exempted from the terrorist label.61 Similarly, Cuba remains on the State Department's list of "state sponsors of terrorism," but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,62 former Latin American state terrorists63 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups64 is completely ignored. Most glaringly, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia, and Indonesia—and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.65—is hardly ever discussed in the mainstream "terrorist sanctuaries" literature. From a discourse analytic perspective, it can further be argued that the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse often functions to promote a set of partisan political projects. For example, the discourse describes an almost infinite number of potential "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens," including: all failed, weak, or poor states; the widely accepted list of state sponsors of terrorism: a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations; Islamic charities and NGOs; informal, unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the Internet; diasporas in Western countries; groups and regions characterized by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical Islamist organizations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent and revolutionary movements; and "extremist" ideologies—among others. The identification of these groups and domains as "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens" then functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions against them—all in the name of counterterrorism. The point is that there may be other political reasons for taking action against such groups which the "terrorist sanctuary" label obscures. From this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse can be shown to support a range of discrete political projects and interests, including: limiting expressions of dissent; controlling the media; centralizing executive power; creating a surveillance society; expanding state regulation of social life; retargeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counterinsurgency programmes where the real aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order66; de-legitimizing all forms of counterhegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal international order; and selectively justifying projects of regime change**,67** economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political movements. In short, the discourse functions—in its present form—to permit the extension of Western state hegemony both internationally and domestically. I Ineffectual Policies A final criticism of the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has proved in its prescriptions to be largely ineffectual and in many cases, counterproductive. In particular. the policy of employing military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens," a reasonable policy within the confines of the discourse, actually has an astonishing record of failure. For example, Israel has mounted military strikes and targeted assassination against "terrorist sanctuaries" in the Palestinian territories and surrounding states for over fifty years without any significant reduction in the overall level of terrorism. The apartheid regime in South Africa adopted a similarly futile policy against its neighbours during the 1980s. U.S. military strikes on Libya in 1986, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and the use of force in the current War on Terror against Afghanistan and Iraq, have also failed to noticeably reduce the overall number of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. More broadly, the use of military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" in Colombia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka. the Philippines, Turkey, and elsewhere has in every case failed to appreciably affect the level of antistate terrorist violence. It could be argued that the attempts since September 11 to eliminate "terrorist sanctuaries" in Afghanistan. Iraq, and South Lebanon in particular, have in fact, had the opposite effect. In many respects, these military interventions have solidified and greatly strengthened various Middle Eastern insurgent and "terrorist" groups, reinforced new militant movements and coalitions, provided new regions of conflict where dissident groups can gain military experience and greatly in creased overall levels of anti-Western sentiment across the region." It is probable that the price of these policies will be many more years of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an ongoing international terrorist campaign against U.S. interests and its allies. The main problem of course, is that the discourse focuses on the symptoms and enablers of dissident terrorism, rather than its underlying drivers and poses a palliative remedy rather than a curative one. From this viewpoint, it is actually an impediment to dealing with terrorism because it functions as a closed system of discourse, preventing discussion of the political grievances which cause individuals and groups to seek out places of sanctuary from where they can launch attacks in the first place. CONCLUSION There is a need for researchers and public officials to be far more reflective and critical of the language they employ and the "knowledge" they produce, because discourse and knowledge is never neutral; it always works for someone and for something. In this case, the language and knowledge of the "terrorism sanctuaries" discourse frequently works to maintain the hegemony of certain powerful states and a particular international order which is beneficial to a few, but violent and unjust to many more. It also works to obscure the much greater violence and suffering caused by current Western counterterrorism policies (which have cost the lives of well over 40,000 civilians69 and caused incalculable material destruction since September 11. 2001), the double standards and selectivity of Western approaches to terrorism and the ongoing problem of civilian-directed state terror.

#### Labeling Cuba a “state sponsor of terror” hurts US credibility – removing Cuba would free resources and increase international trust. The CP ensures US credibility remains low.

**Stephens 11** – Executive director at Center for Democracies in the Americas, panelist at George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, Cuban policy expert for the Washington Office on Latin America (Sarah, Center for International policy/Latin American Working Group, “A Call for Cuba’s Removal from the List of State Sponsers of Terrorism”, 12/1/11, <http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Cuba/lawg_cip_dec_2011.pdf)> //RGP

My second point is that this really bad U.S. policy. When we treat Cuba as a state that sponsors ¶ terror –when it is not –we waste our tax dollars and undermine the credibility of our efforts ¶ against genuine threats.¶ We also alarm and anger our allies. They object to the reach of our sanctions across borders. ¶ This forms the basis of their complaints against the U.S. embargo when the U.N. condemns our ¶ sanctions every year. All of this is likely to get worse, not better, as our enforcement of anti-terror and anti-moneylaundering laws become more aggressive. ¶ Already, these enforcement trends are causing foreign banks with interests in the U.S. to ¶ terminate their banking relationships with Cuba. They are deciding that the risk of doing ¶ business with Cuba that could trip them up with U.S. authorities is greater than the benefit of ¶ maintaining those relationships. They are cutting ties as a matter of business discretion, not U.S. ¶ law.¶ Britain’s ambassador to Cuba told me in a meeting last June that the reach of our sanctions make ¶ it impossible for many small and medium sized businesses in the U.K. to make legal investments ¶ or legal transactions because of the risks involved. That’s a loss for Cuba and a loss for British ¶ firms and workers.¶ This is serious business, but it sometimes reveals itself in farcical ways. Clif Burns at the Export ¶ Law Blog reported recently on this incident. An obscure office inside the S.E.C. wrote the ¶ United Parcel Service and challenged the fact that they delivered packages to Cuba because it is ¶ subject to economic sanctions and export controls. UPS wrote them back explaining they were ¶ allowed to deliver packages that contained lawful deliveries. The complexity and reach of our ¶ laws, at times, exceeds the ability of our enforcement agencies to apply them rationally.¶ Cuba’s presence on the state sponsors’ list is emblematic of our political dilemma. The ¶ definition of a self-licking ice cream cone is this: it is a process or thing that offers few benefits ¶ and exists primarily to justify its own existence. Cuba’s designation is perfect for the hardliners ¶ in Congress to block otherwise rational policy changes or initiatives – because, after all, U.S. law ¶ says we’d be helping a state sponsor of terror. Let me give you three examples.¶ Congressman David Rivera uses it to justify trying to stop Repsol and Cuba from drilling ¶ together for oil. He said his legislation to block drilling was necessary to – and I quote – “ensure that Florida taxpayers are not made to pay for an environmental disaster caused by a terrorist ¶ regime.”¶ When Senators Menendez and Rubio sought to stop President Obama from increasing the ¶ number of airports allowed to serve the Cuban market, their legislation sought to prevent the ¶ expansion of direct flights to state sponsors of terrorism.

#### The credibility imperative causes threat inflation

Fettweis August 2010 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and Comparative Politics from the University of Maryland-College Park, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “The Remnants of Honor: Pathology, Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy”, SSRN)

Hyperbole The credibility imperative often produces rather gaudy hyperbole, or at least underexplained dangers, even in otherwise sober analysts. If the United States were to lose credibility, hawks warn that the floodgates would open to a variety of catastrophes, setting off dominoes that would eventually not only threaten vital interests and make war necessary, but might somehow lead to the end of the republic itself (or to the death of freedom, or to the destruction of civilization, or other horrific disaster). The credibility imperative warns that momentum toward the abyss can begin with the smallest demonstration of irresolution, thus sustaining the vision of an interdependent system where there are no inconsequential events. Snowballs are be easier to stop at the top of the hill, before they have gained momentum.43 Therefore, even tiny slips can begin the United States down the slope toward unmitigated disaster. Once issues are framed in such terms, belligerence becomes understandable. Foreign policy is by necessity a worst-case-scenario business, and decision makers are always wise to hedge against negative outcomes.44 Since a loss of credibility offers a plausible-sounding route to national ruin, it seems logical for policymakers to pay limited costs in the present if by doing so they can avoid unlimited disasters in the future. After all, while incorrect academics face virtually no consequences, missteps by leaders can often be catastrophic. The desire to prevent negative outcomes is prudent; the fear of triggering impossible outcomes is pathological. The credibility imperative inspires decision makers to cross the line between the two time and time again. It never seems necessary to explain precisely how these catastrophes could occur. The mere suggestion that inaction could lead to ruin is often sufficient to shout down those who object to demonstrations of resolution in minor crises. Once leaders internalize the belief that threats are interdependent, it seems to logically follow that the loss of credibility anywhere would be disastrous for U.S. interests everywhere. The costs of tomorrow’s catastrophe will always outweigh those of today’s minor display of resolution. George Ball stood little chance against Robert McNamara. Quemoy and Matsu might not have not seemed to be terribly important to U.S national security in 1955, for example, but if they fell to the Chinese without response the resulting loss of credibility would enable the communists “to begin their objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, right back to Hawaii and even to the United States,” according to John Foster Dulles.45 In 1983, President Reagan told Congress that if the United States failed in Central America, “our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy.”46 Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute argued that the negotiations with China over the return of the crew during the EP-3A mini-crisis with China in 2001 were “part of an enormously important process, in which the survival of the United States may very well be at stake.”47 Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird warned that the stakes in Iraq “could not be higher for the continued existence of our own democracy.”48 The hyperbole produced by the war in Vietnam deserves special mention, since it was in a class by itself. Vice President Johnson worried in 1961 that if South Vietnam were to fall, “the United States must inevitably surrender the Pacific…and pull back our defenses to San Francisco.”49 Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote that if U.S. commitments became discredited through defeat, “the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war.”50 As President, Johnson warned his cabinet that “if we run out on Southeast Asia, there will be trouble ahead in every part of the globe – not just in Asia, but in the Middle East and in Europe, in Africa and Latin America. I am convinced that our retreat from this challenge will open the path to World War III.”51 His successor argued that defeat “would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace – in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.”52 And Henry Kissinger felt that if South Vietnam were allowed to fall, it would represent a “fundamental threat, over a period of time, to the security of the United States.”53 Somehow “untold millions would be in jeopardy.”54 Audiences often seem distressingly willing to accept projections of catastrophe at face value. Rarely are policymakers or analysts asked to justify these visions, or pressed to examine the logic connecting the present decisions to such catastrophic future consequences. Could interdependence alone set off such enormous strings of disasters? Why should anyone believe that the loss of credibility would result in an unprecedented, unimaginable outcomes? When the United States did not respond belligerently to the seizure of the Pueblo in 1968, Kissinger believed that “we paid for it in many intangible ways, in demoralized friends and emboldened adversaries.”55 No one seemed to ask him in what ways, or which friends, or which adversaries, or if in general one should allow such imprecise, borderline delusional beliefs to drive policy. In this case and others, the shadow of the future blinded the policymakers of the present. During debates, establishing logical connections is never as important as establishing the potential, however slim, for catastrophe. The public is meant to accept these warnings on faith alone, with the understanding that the trusted elite have more experience and expertise in these matters. Few would oppose the defense of Quemoy and Matsu once it was explained that belligerence would prevent a “catastrophic war.” Similarly, it was difficult to argue that aid to the Contras was not in the national interest once it became linked to the survival of NATO and the safety of “our homeland.” Once policymakers internalize the imperative to remain credible, logic and reason can become casualties of fear. It is tempting to doubt the sincerity of those employing hyperbole. It is possible that these decision makers did not really believe what they are saying, and were instead attempting to instill fear in the public for political purposes. Divining the “true motivation” behind the statements and actions of political leaders is a popular cottage industry; it is also necessarily speculative and tendentious. There is little reason to doubt that those under the spell of the credibility imperative mean exactly what they say. After all, it is not only leaders who are guilty – analysts and scholars with little political pressure often reach much the same conclusions. Ultimately, whether statements like these are expressions of actual belief or merely attempts to sell what might be unpopular policies to a skeptical public is not as important as the recognition of the hyperbole, understanding of the origins and minimization of its effects.

## Ethics

**Do not evaluate their value system without first assessing the consequences of its actual implementation. Viewing ethics in isolation is irresponsible & complicit with the evil they criticize.**

**Issac** **2002**.,( Jeffery C. Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington & Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life. PhD Yale University. From “Ends, Means, and Politics.” Dissent Magazine. Volume 49. Issue # 2. Available online @ subscribing institutions using Proquest. Herm

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

# 2NC

## Ethics

**Focusing exclusively on epistemology or ontology fails**

**Jarvis, 2K** – Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina (Darryl, Studies in International Relations, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 16-17)

There are, of course, problems with ontologically derived forms of theory. Postmodernists naturally dismiss this conception of theory and are not entirely wrong for doing so. Realism is not above criticism, and structural-realism even more so.58 But then again, neither is postmodernism! But this is not the point. I am not here attempting to defend realism against postmodernism or to dismiss postmodernism entirely from the purview of International Relations. Rather, what I am attempting to do is defend the institution of theory against postmodernism which, in its more virulent forms, aims at its deconstruction and obliteration. So too am I attempting to defend the ontological aspect of theory against those who would engage exclusively in epistemological debate. For there to be theory in International Relations, ontological description must be the first order of things; without first defining the domain of international politics, identifying those entities and things we wish to explain and understand, epistemological debate would be altogether pointless. Save for this, the discipline threatens to transpose itself into philosophy and not International Relations, to be condemned to perpetual metaphysical reflection but without reference to the social world we are attempting to understand. Of course, this does not exonerate us from previous mistakes. International Relations, largely because of the dominance of positivism in the discipline, has, in the past, been apt to ontological description in the absence of epistemological reflection. Practitioners in the discipline have rarely seen a need to question the epistemological basis of their scholarship as Thomas Biersteker forcefully acknowledged.59 Yet, as he also reminds us, developing theory and generating knowledge requires judicious use of both ontological description and epistemological explanation. These are not mutually exclusive dimensions of theoretical discourse, but the elemental ingredients necessary to the construction of discourse itself. The exclusive focus upon one dimension to the detriment of the other probably explains why, according to William Kreml and Charles Kegley, "International relations research today . . . has failed to reach agreement about several fundamental issues ... (1) the central questions to be asked, (2) the basic units of analysis (e.g., states or nonstate actors), (3) the levels of analysis at which various questions should be explored, (4) the methods by which hypotheses should be tested and unwarranted inferences prevented, (5) the criteria by which theoretical progress is to be judged, and (6) how inquiry should be organized in order to generate the knowledge that will lead to international peace, prosperity, and justice."60 ^

## CP

#### Cuba’s position on the list destroys US credibility

Metzker 6/13 – writer for the Inter Press Service (Jared Metzker, “Pressure Building from U.S. to Remove Cuba from Terror Sponsor List”, IPS, 6/13/13, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/pressure-building-for-u-s-to-remove-cuba-from-terror-sponsor-list/)//VP

According to Robert L. Muse, a specialist on the legality of U.S. policy toward Cuba, there are currently three ostensible reasons for Cuba’s inclusion in the most recent list: that it has allowed Basque separatists to reside within its borders, that it has dealings with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that it harbors fugitives wanted for crimes committed in the United States.¶ Muse, who spoke Tuesday at CSIS, claimed the first two reasons were void because the countries concerned actually condone Cuba’s relationship with their adversaries. Cuba is currently host to negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government, and Spanish leaders prefer that Basque rebels remain in Cuba – and out of Spain.¶ These interactions with rebel groups, in Muse’s opinion, “can hardly be a basis even for criticism”. It is only the third justification, that Cuba harbors U.S. fugitives, which he said “could fairly bear description as a reason” for keeping Cuba on the list.¶ Cuba has harbored a number of fugitives seeking refuge from the U.S. justice system. The most prominent is Assata Shakur, an African-American poet and participant in 1970s black liberation movements who was allegedly involved in the killing of a police officer. She was convicted for the murder but escaped and in 1984 gained political asylum in Cuba, where she has remained ever since.¶ Early last month, Shakur became the first woman to be added to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Most Wanted Terrorist list. But Muse notes that this designation was “arbitrary and capricious”, as neither she nor any other fugitive residing in Cuba has been accused, let alone convicted, of international terrorism.¶ Politics as usual¶ Both Muse and Bilbao concluded that Cuba’s continued presence on the State Department’s terrorism list arises less from these shaky legal justifications than from political calculations.¶ Others have arrived at similar conclusions for years. In 2002, a former adviser to President Bill Clinton suggested that maintaining Cuba on the list keeps happy a certain part of the voting public in Florida – a politically important state with a large Cuban exile population – and “it doesn’t cost anything”.¶ Muse disagreed with the latter part of that statement, however. He noted that by behaving arbitrarily in what should be a strictly legal matter, the United States was damaging its “credibility on the issue of international terrorism” and diminishing its “seriousness of purpose” in using the term “terrorism” in a meaningful manner.¶ Proponents of the status quo argue the opposite, saying that by removing Cuba the United States would damage its credibility by effectively making a concession. Bilbao explained to IPS that those such views focus on the “spin” of the Cuban government rather than on the actual consequences of taking Cuba off the list, a move he believes would ultimately benefit the United States.¶ “I think the priority of the U.S. government should be to determine what’s in its best interests,” he told IPS.¶ Muse went a step further, saying the list itself is a problem. He noted that even while the list includes countries that don’t deserve to be on it, proven sponsors, such as Pakistan, of international terrorism – albeit those with friendly relations with the U.S. – are absent from it.¶ His recommendation to solve the problem was simple: “Just scrap the list.¶

**Empirically denied and alternate causality – hundreds of thousands of species die annually**

**Paltrowitz, 01** (JD Brooklyn Journal of I-Law, 2001 (A Greening of the World Trade Organisation”)

However, the panel did not take into account the practical reality that negotiations are time-consuming. The environment, animal life and human life can all be irreparably harmed as time passes. n105 For instance, one scholar has reported [\*1807] that "the world is losing between 27,000 and 150,000 species per year, approximately seventy-four species every day, and three every hour and up to seventy percent of the world's fisheries are depleted or under stress after years of over-exploitation." n106 This concern is especially pertinent in the case of the eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin, which are on the endangered species list. n107 Yet, even for the dolphin species that are not endangered, a similar concern applies because if dolphins continue to be maimed or killed in tuna purse seines then their numbers could become seriously depleted to the point where they may be put on the endangered species list. In short, Tuna-Dolphin I shows the preeminence of trade values at the expense of environmental values. Therefore, the panel's acknowledgment of the WTO's Preamble rang hollow when it stated: " . . . that the provisions of the GATT impose few constraints on a contracting party's implementation of domestic environmental policies." n108

**2. Species extinction won't cause human extinction – humans and the environment are adaptable**

**Doremus, 00** (Holly, Professor of Law at UC Davis Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers [\*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course. Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.

# 1NR

## Politics

**This is a prerequisite to their discourse claims – the immigrant’s body is the symbolic site for global social change. At best, the affirmative is a band-aid domestic solution that does not address how people should address the Other**

**Benhabib** **12** (Seyla, Eugene Meyer professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University, “The Morality of Migration”, July 29, <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/stone-immigration/#h>[])//VP

Migrations pit two moral and legal principles, foundational to the modern state system, against each other. On one hand, the human right of individuals to move across borders whether for economic, personal or professional reasons or to seek asylum and refuge is guaranteed by Articles 13 and 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the other hand, Article 21 of the declaration recognizes a basic right to self-government, stipulating that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government.” Under the current regime of states, that fundamental right includes control over borders as well as determining who is to be a citizen as distinguished from a resident or an alien. The international system straddles these dual principles but it has not been able to reconcile them. The irony of global developments is that while state sovereignty in economic, military, and technological domains is eroded and national borders have become more porous, they are still policed to keep out aliens and intruders. The migrant’s body has become the symbolic site upon which such contradictions are enacted. Why not advocate a “world without borders” then? From a moral point of view, no child deserves to be born on one side of the border rather than another, and it is deeply antithetical to our moral principles to punish individuals for what they cannot help being or doing. Punishment implies responsibility and accountability for one’s actions and choices; clearly, children who through their parents’ choices end up on one side of the border rather than another cannot be penalized for these choices. A strong advocate of the right to self-government might retort that rewarding certain children for the wrongs committed by their parents, in this case illegal immigration, by legalizing undocumented youths is illogical as well as immoral and that “the right thing to do” would be to deport all undocumented migrants – parents and children alike. Apart from the sheer impracticality of this solution, its advocates seem to consider undocumented “original entry” into a country as the analog of “original sin” that no amount of subsequent behavior and atonement can alter. But such punitive rigor unfairly conflates the messy and often inadvertent reasons that lead one to become an undocumented migrant with no criminal intent to break the law. If conditions in a person’s native country so endanger his life and well-being and he becomes willing to risk illegality in order to survive, his right to survival, from a moral point of view, carries as much weight as does the new country’s claim to control borders against migrants. Immanuel Kant, therefore, called the moral claim to seek refuge or respite in the lands of another, a “universal right of hospitality,” provided that the intentions of the foreigner upon arriving on foreign lands were peaceful. Such a right, he argued, belonged to each human being placed on this planet who had to share the earth with others. Even though morally the right to hospitality is an individual right, the socioeconomic and cultural causes of migrations are for the most part collective. Migrations occur because of economic, environmental, cultural and historical “push” and “pull” factors. “We are here,” say migrants, “because in effect you were there.” “We did not cross the border; the border crossed us.” We do have special obligations to our neighbors, as opposed to moral obligations to humanity at large, if, for example, our economy has devastated theirs; if our industrial output has led to environmental harm or if our drug dependency has encouraged the formation of transnational drug cartels. These claims of interdependence require a third moral principle — in addition to the right of universal hospitality and the right to self-government — to be brought into consideration: associative obligations among peoples arising through historical factors. States cannot ignore such associative obligations. Migration policies, though they are often couched in nation-centric terms, always have transnational causes and consequences. It is impossible to address Mexican migration into the United States, for example, without considering the decades-long dependency of the rich California agricultural fields upon the often undocumented and unorganized labor of Mexican workers, some of whose children have now grown up to become “Dreamers” (so named after the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act introduced to Congress in 2001). Among the three million students who graduate from United States high schools, 65,000 are undocumented. The United States owes these young people a special duty of hospitality, not only because we, as a society, have benefited from the circumstances under which their parents entered this country, but also because they have formed strong affiliations with this society through being our friends, students, neighbors and coworkers. In a liberal-democratic society the path to citizenship must follow along these associative ties through which an individual shows him or herself to be capable and worthy of citizenship. Migratory movements are sites of imperfect justice in that they bring into play the individual right to freedom of movement, the universal right to hospitality and the right of collectives to self-government as well as specific associative moral obligations. These rights cannot always be easily reconciled. Furthermore, international law does not as yet recognize a “human right to citizenship” for migrants, and considers this a sovereign prerogative of individual states. Nonetheless, the responsible politician is the one who acts with a lucid understanding of the necessity to balance these principles rather than giving in to a punitive rigorism that would deny, in Thomas Jefferson’s words, “the right which nature has given to all men of departing from [and I would add, from joining with] the country in which choice, not chance has placed them” (1774).

**DA is key to the economy**

**Krudy ‘13** [Edward. Politics for Reuters. “Analysis: Immigration Reform could Boost US Economic Growth” Reuters, 1/29/13 ln]

**The sluggish U.S. economy could get a lift** if President Barack Obama and a bipartisan group of senators succeed in what could be the biggest overhaul of the nation's immigration system since the 1980s. Relaxed immigration rules could **encourage entrepreneurship**, increase demand for housing, raise tax revenues and help reduce the budget deficit, economists said. By helping more immigrants enter the country legally and allowing many illegal immigrants to remain, the United States could help offset a slowing birth rate and put itself in a stronger demographic position than aging Europe, Japan and China. "**Numerous industries in the U**nited **S**tates **can't find the workers they need, right now even in a bad economy**, to fill their orders and expand their production as the market demands," said Alex Nowrasteh, an immigration specialist at the libertarian Cato Institute. The emerging **consensus among economists** is that **immigration** provides a net benefit. It **increases** **demand** and productivity, helps drive innovation and lowers prices, although there is little agreement on the size of the impact on economic growth. President Barack Obama plans to launch his second-term push for a U.S. immigration overhaul during a visit to Nevada on Tuesday and will make it a high priority to win congressional approval of a reform package this year, the White House said. The chances of major reforms gained momentum on Monday when a bipartisan group of senators agreed on a framework that could eventually give 11 million illegal immigrants a chance to become American citizens. Their proposals would also include means to keep and attract workers with backgrounds in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. This would be aimed both at foreign students attending American universities where they are earning advanced degrees and high-tech workers abroad. An estimated 40 percent of scientists in the United States are immigrants and studies show immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses, said Nowrasteh. Boosting legal migration and legalizing existing workers could add $1.5 trillion to the U.S. economy over the next 10 years, estimates Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, a specialist in immigration policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. That's an annual increase of 0.8 percentage points to the economic growth rate, **currently stuck at about 2 percent**. REPUBLICANS' HISPANIC PUSH Other economists say the potential benefit to growth is much lower. Richard Freeman, an economist at Harvard, believes most of the benefits to the economy from illegal immigrants already in the United States has already been recorded and legalizing their status would produce only incremental benefits. While opposition to reform lingers on both sides of the political spectrum and any controversial legislation can easily meet a quick end in a divided Washington, the chances of substantial change seem to be rising. Top Republicans such as Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana are not mincing words about the party's need to appeal to the Hispanic community and foreign-born voters who were turned off by Republican candidate Mitt Romney's tough talk in last year's presidential campaign. A previous Obama plan, unveiled in May 2011, included the creation of a guest-worker program to meet agricultural labor needs and something similar is expected to be in his new proposal. The senators also indicated they would support a limited program that would allow companies in certain sectors to import guest workers if Americans were not available to fill some positions. An additional boost to growth could come from rising wages for newly legalized workers and higher productivity from the arrival of more highly skilled workers from abroad. Increased tax revenues would help federal and state authorities plug budget deficits although the benefit to government revenues will be at least partially offset by the payment of benefits to those who gain legal status. In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that proposed immigration reform in that year would have generated $48 billion in revenue from 2008 to 2017, while costing $23 billion in health and welfare payments. There is also unlikely to be much of a saving on enforcement from the senators' plan because they envisage tougher border security to prevent further illegal immigration and a crackdown on those overstaying visas. One way to bump up revenue, according to a report co-authored by University of California, Davis economist Giovanni Peri, would be to institute a cap-and-trade visa system. Peri estimated it could generate up to $1.2 billion annually. Under such a system, the government would auction a certain number of visas employers could trade in a secondary market. "A more efficient, more transparent and more flexible immigration system would help firms expand, contribute to more job creation in the United States, and slow the movement of operations abroad," according to a draft report, soon to be published as part of a study by the Hamilton Project, a think tank. There was no immediate sign that either the Obama or the senators' plan would include such a system. The long-term argument for immigration is a demographic one. Many developed nations are seeing their populations age, adding to the burden of pension and healthcare costs on wage-earners. Immigration in the United States would need to double to keep the working-age population stable at its current 67 percent of total population, according to George Magnus, a senior independent economic adviser at UBS in London, While Magnus says a change of that magnitude may prove too politically sensitive, the focus should be on attracting highly skilled and entrepreneurial immigrants in the way Canada and Australia do by operating a points system for immigrants rather than focusing mainly on family connections. "The trick is to shift the balance of migration towards those with education (and) skills," he added. HARD ROAD Academics at major universities such as Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology often lament that **many of their top foreign graduates end up returning to their home countries because visas are hard to get.** "We have so much talent that is sitting here in the universities," said William Kerr, a professor at Harvard Business School. "I find it very difficult to swallow that we then make it so hard for them to stay." The last big amnesty for illegal immigrants was in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan legalized about 3 million already in the country. Numerous studies have shown that subsequently their wages rose significantly. Research on how immigration affects overall wages is inconclusive. George Borjas at Harvard says immigration has created a small net decrease in overall wages for those born in the United States, concentrated among the low-skilled, while Giovani Peri at UC Davis found that immigration boosts native wages over the long run. Hinojosa-Ojeda stresses that any reform needs to make it easier for guest workers to enter the country to avoid a new build-up of illegal workers. "If we don't create a mechanism that can basically bring in 300,000 to 400,000 new workers a year into a variety of labor markets and needs, we could be setting ourselves up for that again," said Hinojosa-Ojeda. Nowrasteh at Cato also believes an expanded guest worker program would stem illegal immigration and allow industries to overcome labor shortages. He found that harsher regulations in recent years in Arizona were adversely affecting agricultural production, increasing financial burdens on business and even negatively impacting the state's struggling real estate market. Some large companies have fallen foul of tougher enforcement regulations. Restaurant chain Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc fired roughly 500 staff in 2010 and 2011 after undocumented workers were found on its payrolls. Putting the chill on other employers, it is now subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation into its hiring. "**The current system doesn't seem to work for anyone**," Chipotle spokesman Chris Arnold said.

**Nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows 9**

Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever**. While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies** (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the **sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would** almost certainly **be the Middle East**. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran **could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge**, particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If** the **fiscal stimulus focus for** these **countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water** also **becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

**The means all parts**

**Merriam-Websters, 8** [Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary]

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

**“Federal Government” is all three branches**

**Truman Library, No Date** (Harry S. Truman: Library and Museum- One of thirteen presidential libraries, “Three Branches of Government”, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/teacher_lessons/3branches/1.htm>) MaxL

Our federal government has three parts. They are the Executive, (President and about 5,000,000 workers) Legislative (Senate and House of Representatives) and Judicial (Supreme Court and lower Courts).

#### 1) Spending PC is key– shapes uniqueness by creating momentum

Nakamura 10/24

David, Washington Post, Pressing House GOP, Obama evokes George W. Bush in immigration speech, 10/24/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/10/24/pressing-house-gop-obama-evokes-george-w-bush-in-immigration-speech/

For the second time in two weeks, President Obama called on House Republicans to support a broad overhaul of immigration laws, invoking his predecessor George W. Bush in a bid to restore momentum to a key second-term priority.¶ Obama didn't mention Bush by name, but he reminded his audience of immigration advocates in the East Room that the former president championed a similar, though ultimately unsuccessful, comprehensive immigration plan in 2006 and 2007.¶ "Some folks think, 'Well, if Obama's for it, then I'm against it,'" said Obama, who was joined by Vice President Biden. "I would remind everybody that my Republican predecessor was for it."¶ "I also believe that good policy is good politics in this instance," he added. "If folks are consumed with the politics of a broken immigration system, they should take a closer look at the polls because the American people support this. Everybody wins here if we work together to get this done."¶ Obama's remarks are part of a White House effort to gain traction for the president's domestic agenda in the wake of the end of the 16-day government shutdown last week. In addition to immigration, Obama called again for Congress to pass a farm bill.¶ House Republicans have said they will not support a bipartisan immigration plan, approved by the Senate in June, that features a 13-year path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. GOP leaders said they are instead working on a series of smaller-scale bills, including additional border security. But they have not yet put forward a bill that includes offering legal status or citizenship for the nation's 12 million undocumented immigrants.¶ "This isn’t just the right thing to do; it's the smart thing to do," Obama said. "But just because something is smart, good for the economy, fiscally responsible, supported by business, labor, evangelicals, Democrats and Republicans, that does not mean it will get done. This is Washington, after all. Everything tends to be viewed through a political prism."¶ Former president George W. Bush and his brother Jeb, the former Florida governor, have both spoken out this year in support of immigration reform. Bush has said his failure to get a comprehensive bill through Congress was one of the major regrets of his presidency.¶ Obama called on Congress to get a bill passed by year's end, but such a timetable appears unlikely — and with another round of budget negotiations slated for January, the window is tightening. Some advocates have said the immigration effort could spill into the spring, after the deadline for Congressional primary races.¶ With public opinion polls showing widespread frustration with the GOP in the wake of the government shutdown, the administration hopes to keep the political pressure on through immigration and other domestic priorities.

#### 2) continued pressure on Boehner key

Sullivan 10/24 Sean, Washington Post, The Fix, John Boehner’s next big test: Immigration, 10/24/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/10/24/john-boehners-next-big-test-immigration-reform/

The policy imperative already exists for some House Republicans — perhaps enough of them that if Boehner allowed a vote, reform of some type could pass with a majority of House Democrats and a minority of House Republicans, as did last week’s deal to end the government shutdown and raise the debt ceiling. (What specifically could pass and whether Obama could accept it is another question.)¶ What’s not clear is whether Boehner would be willing to chart a path with less than majority GOP support again so soon after the last time and without his back against the wall as it was in the fiscal standoff.¶ This much we know: The White House and Senate Democrats will keep applying pressure on Boehner to act on immigration. Obama’s remarks are the latest example of his plan. The speaker will be feeling external and internal pressure to move ahead on immigration.¶ But he will also feel pressure from conservatives to oppose it. Here’s the thing, though: Boehner listened to the right flank of his conference in the fiscal fight, and that path was politically destructive for his party. That’s enough to believe he will at least entertain the possibility of tuning the hard-liners out a bit more this time around.¶ All of which is why it’s too soon to cross immigration off the “maybe it will still get done” list just yet.